

A

SUMMARY OF TAB A

1. Mr. Amory emphasized his feeling Communist strengths far outweigh weaknesses. Defined vulnerability as weakness subject to exploitation. Subdivided subject into long-range, i.e., cumulative impact of liberalization, and short-range, i.e., current housing shortage. He discusses the following eight or nine major subjects as possible weaknesses:

- a. Communist Party abroad sore point where Soviets trying promote neutrality.
- b. Yugoslavia: Limited weakness -- Yugoslavs are revisionists.
- c. China: Concludes that ties between ^{allies} ~~(S)~~ much stronger than divisive factors. Dismisses commune question as minor difference. Warns that greatest potential vulnerability to Soviet order is China.
- d. European Satellites: Believes high tide weakness reached in late 1956. Suggests advantages in promoting Soviet troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe.
- e. Soviet Minorities: This vulnerability almost finished.
- f. Economy:: Soviets nearest approach to self-sufficiency in modern times. Farm problem basically licked except for labor waste. Low individual consumption calculated Soviet plan, not inherent or accidental weakness. Greatest weakness is lack of flexibility. Trying to correct lack of balance, improve consumer

goods production and foreign economic policy. Exploitability very low. Material and technical imports from West could speed Soviet progress. Denial from West not fatal, merely delaying.

g. Turning from things to people, evolving class and regional interests. ^{Managerial} ~~Managerial~~ class still under Party control. Military influential but keenly aware of Zhukov fate. Scientists more hopeful, more contact needed. Intellectuals disaffected but not very effective. Although youth not out of hand, this may be most profound vulnerability. Soviet progress leaves them cold. Revolutionaries dying off. Party usefulness in question. Leadership lacks confidence in people, i. e., restrictions on exchange programs.

h. No orderly succession process.

i. Related to (h). 300 leaders certainly no democracy but no one-man band.

2. Mr. Amory concludes very little in way of prospect for early or ultimate Communist collapse. No obvious guides for action to weaken or change Bloc.

WE